Abstract. Knowledge management remains one of the most debated topics
The Cartesian Quest for an Unshakable Foundation for Scientifi c Knowledge
René Descartes doubtless had a radical and lasting infl uence on the concept of knowledge in modern philosophy. In 1641, he published his well-known work, Meditations on First Philosophy (Meditationes de prima philosophia), in which he searches for an 'unshakable foundation' (fundamentum inconcussum) as the starting point for the sciences. This search exhibits a radical rejection of all common notions associated with human knowledge in everyday life to the effect that any kind of knowledge that could potentially be false (e.g. knowledge derived from sensory experience) is methodically excluded as a possible secure basis for an exact science. This 'methodic doubt' continues to rule out one possible source for certain knowledge after the other until Descartes fi nally arrives at the indubitable nature of the very act of human thought itself: 'I think, therefore I am' The self-contained inner sphere of consciousness has, at this stage, been 'cut off' entirely from the 'world of objects'. 'Inner self' and 'outer objects' now stand fundamentally divided from and 'opposite' to each other. No sort of certain knowledge regarding any 'empirical facts' pertaining to the world of objects can be found by contemplating the very act of thought itself (Descartes, 1986: 117; III.19) . Consequently, anything pertaining to the world has to be explicitly and methodically re-constructed 'piece by piece' within the inner sphere of consciousness in some scientifi cally reliable way.
Descartes lays out his basic rules for a method of securing explicit knowledge in an important treatise entitled Rules for the Direction of the Mind (Regulae ad directionem ingenii). This treatise contains paradigm statements that illustrate the central role attributed to 'method' in modern Western culture. The last sentence of Descartes' second methodological rule on how to direct one's mind in the right way in order to secure knowledge explicitly states that the correct way to approach truth requires refraining from dealing with any objects that are incapable of yielding a level of certainty similar to that which could be arrived at through arithmetic or geometric proofs (Descartes, 1973: 13; II.6) . This shows how the quest for
Introducing and Examining the 'Great Divide': Western and Eastern Conceptions of Knowledge and Associated Problematic Terminological Issues
If the notion of 'Western knowledge' were to be reduced to a purely Cartesian conception of knowledge, then the answer to the question of whether or not explicit and tacit concepts of knowledge are in some way reconcilable would clearly have to be negative. If such a reduction were the only available option, our whole investigation of Nonaka's endeavours would have already reached a 'dead end' and would have to conclude that his framework for integrating Western explicit knowledge and Eastern tacit knowledge was doomed to fail right from the outset. Any form of tacit, prepropositional 'knowledge' could never count as true knowledge since, by defi nition, it fails to meet even the most basic criteria, such as, for example, being able to be expressed in purely explicit terms, let alone in fully formalized terms ready to be dealt with along the lines of a mathematical analysis or logical deduction. If, as Nonaka suggests, 'Eastern conceptions of knowledge' place a special emphasis on 'tacit knowing', then the 'great divide' between Western and Eastern knowledge would have to remain entirely irreconcilable as the tacit knowing deemed of primary importance in Eastern thought would not even qualify as a potential candidate for Western knowledge given the defi nition above.
However, the prospects of fi nding ways to 'bridge' Western and Eastern conceptions of knowledge might look less bleak if the notions 'Western' and 'Eastern' were treated with a little more care. Conceptions of knowledge that depart entirely from the Cartesian paradigm have also been propagated by modern Western thinkers, intellectuals and philosophers. Thus, the very notion of 'Western knowledge' is by no means uniform and unambiguous, but rather has to be defi ned with suffi cient breadth to take account of a broad spectrum of 'Western' theories. Hence, from this point onwards, we will place quotation marks around the terms 'Western' and 'Eastern' when referring to them as broad, non-uniform terms capable of exhibiting close kinship. It will also be shown that this kinship can, at times, be so close that bridging the 'great divide' between 'Eastern' and 'Western' knowledge turns into a manageable endeavour.
It is useful to recall that Nonaka himself, in fact, happens to cite a 'Western' thinker as his primary source for the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge:
Drawing especially on Polanyi, I conceptualized knowledge in terms of two types, tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. (Nonaka and Scharmer, 1996: 4; Polanyi, 1962 Polanyi, , 1983 As Tsoukas and Vladimirou (2001: 982) correctly point out, Polanyi himself in part of his work clearly 'echoes' the German philosopher Martin Heidegger, i.e. another 'Western' thinker, who several decades prior to Polanyi had Stefan Gueldenberg and Holger Helting argued for the important distinction between formalized, propositional (i.e. explicit) knowledge and everyday contextual (i.e. tacit) knowledge and who considered the latter to provide the basis for the former. We also fi nd a number of direct references to Heidegger in the works of Nonaka et al. (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 26; Nonaka et al., 2000: 14) . Thus, it should be quite evident to Nonaka himself how 'Western' thinkers provide valuable insights and distinctions that can be utilized in the context of elucidating 'Eastern' conceptions of knowledge.
Nonaka's Goal of Combining 'Western' and 'Eastern' Knowledge Concepts: The Missing Roadmap, the Clue and our Task
Although he personally draws heavily on 'Western' intellectual sources in formulating his knowledge creation theory, on a historical scale Nonaka continually stresses the differences between Eastern and Western knowledge throughout their respective intellectual histories. By continuing to highlight what he construes to be the mainstream Western (= Cartesian) conception of knowledge (and subsuming almost the entire 'Western' intellectual history under this term), Nonaka in effect deprives himself of viable ways of elucidating how exactly 'Western' and 'Eastern' knowledge concepts could be interrelated. He could not, of course, suggest that the answer lay in his own 'knowledge creation theory' as this would inevitably raise enormous problems of justifi cation. It would be 'diffi cult' (to put it mildly) to propose an intellectually well grounded theory of 'knowledge generation' by fi rst stressing at great length the magnitude of the differences between Western and Eastern conceptions of knowledge over the course of 2,500 years of history and then end up 'solving' the problem by suggesting the time has now come to simply combine these notions. Nonaka and colleagures do provide a few empirical examples aimed at illustrating their concept of such a combination (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995) , but a more refi ned intellectual roadmap would clearly be needed to make a well grounded case for the meaningful integration of these conceptions of knowledge and devise meaningful ways of communicating the benefi ts to be gained from such a 'bridge' that are intelligible to both 'Westerners' and 'Easterners'. Nonaka and colleagues do not provide any such roadmap, but they at least provide a clue as to where the elements for such a roadmap might be found in their reference to Heidegger (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 26) .
Polanyi and Heidegger count among the few 'Western' thinkers Nonaka quotes favourably, thus suggesting he considers their respective ideas scarce 'Western' exceptions to the Cartesian paradigm and hence of use in elucidating the theoretical basis for his own 'knowledge creation theory'. Although the role of Polanyi's work in Nonaka's theory has been discussed at length in recent knowledge management literature, Heidegger's groundbreaking work on the nature of knowledge has received comparatively little attention. Thus, scrutinizing Heidegger (as we will do in the remainder of this section) is far more likely to open up new terrain in the current debate on Nonaka's conception of knowledge.
Organization 14(1) Articles
The aim of the following is to illustrate that Nonaka's references to Heidegger are indeed apt in the sense that a closer investigation of Heidegger's thought will elucidate important aspects of the nature of knowledge capable of augmenting an understanding of the theoretical basis for an intellectually sound and comprehensive knowledge creation theory. Thus, ultimately, Nonaka's allusions to Heidegger can be construed as hinting at new and benefi cial insights for the current debate. However, this does not mean to imply that Nonaka himself explains to any signifi cant degree how his own allusions to Heidegger could potentially assume a powerful role in the context of grounding his theory of knowledge creation in the deep and intellectually sound sense he originally envisioned for it. Nonaka's elaborations of Polanyi might appear 'spartan' in light of the recent rich and refi ned discussions, but the justifi cations and reasons he provides for quoting Heidegger are little more than 'outright ascetic': Nonaka usually confi nes himself to simple statements or mere references to Heidegger, yet does not provide the reader with any sort of elaboration on the basic content, context and signifi cance of such references.
The following Heideggerian analysis will offer some interesting insights into possible ways of 'bridging' the seemingly insurmountable divide between 'Western' and 'Eastern' knowledge concepts. Since Nonaka's knowledge creation theory is in dire need of such a bridge for meaningfully relating explicit and tacit knowledge, this investigation will ultimately also shed some light on viable ways of grounding Nonaka's theory of knowledge generation in an elaborate philosophical theory of knowledge.
Heidegger's Theory of Knowledge, 'Being-with-Others' and His Contributions to the Quest of Bridging the 'Great Divide'
A Phenomenological Interpretation of Human Understanding
In 1927, Heidegger published his famous Being and Time in which he proposes a radical break from the Cartesian conception of knowledge (Heidegger, 1962: 19-24) . Whereas Descartes' meditations were marked by a radically skeptical approach on how to identify a basis for indubitable knowledge, Heidegger's approach places a basic trust in worldly phenomena and builds a concept of knowledge based on that trust. Whereas Descartes believed that the mere possibility of deception warranted an approach that doubted any sort of objects and even the existence of the entire 'outside world', Heidegger points out that deception is only recognizable as deception if there some sort of basic truth revealing itself (Heidegger, 1962) . In other words: without the presence of any sort of truth, deception would simply not be recognizable as such.
Instead of 'doubting' everything on a theoretical level, Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation attempts to uncover how human beings primarily and for the most part dwell in the world. Looking at the way humans conduct their day-to-day business reveals no strict dichotomy between a theorizing subject and a world of objects along Cartesian lines, Bridging 'The Great Divide' Stefan Gueldenberg and Holger Helting but rather makes evident that humans always already dwell in some form of contextual nexus of meaning, i.e. some sort of pre-theoretical understanding of the world they inhabit. Without being explicitly conscious of doing so, we always understand things we encounter in our everyday lives in the light of some particular horizon of contextual meaning; this tacit nexus of understanding could never be explicated as a whole, but rather provides the inescapable tacit background which is always present as the basis for 'objectifying' certain aspects of things in terms of explicit knowledge.
To summarize the fundamental notions of Heidegger's split from the Cartesian tradition: Heidegger's phenomenological analysis aims at showing that the primordial way humans dwell in the world involves so many tacit, pre-propositional aspects in which the human being is interrelated with the structures of the world that it is only possible to treat certain aspects of worldly objects in isolation. A fortiori, Heidegger has to reject Descartes' attempts at calling the existence of the entire world into question, since the Cartesian attempt to 'distill' or abstract the human self entirely from all pre-theoretical ways of being interrelated with the world does not adequately capture the human phenomenon as it shows itself from itself in everyday life, but rather treats it in a very abstract, theoretical sense. Unlike Immanuel Kant, who portrayed the fact that there is still no proof of the 'existence of objects outside of us' (Kant, 1965: 33, B XXXIX) as the 'scandal of philosophy', Heidegger saw the real scandal to lie in the fact that 'such proofs are expected and attempted over and over again' (Heidegger, 1962) . The reason he called such attempts 'scandalous' in the fi rst place is that they are all based on the Cartesian notion of a fundamental separation between the human subject and the objects in the world, yet never call this underlying assumption into question. In other words, a radically skeptical approach along the lines of Descartes rests upon unquestioned, 'dogmatic' assumptions pertaining to the primordial nature of basic human existence that upon closer scrutiny reveals itself to be far less 'theoretical' than portrayed in the Cartesian project that is willing to embark on tremendous levels of abstracting from 'real everyday life' in order to conceive of the human being as a thinking self standing opposite and apart from the world of objects.
Bridging the Great Divide, Part 1: Nishida's Interpretation of the Theoretical 'Intellectual Self' and the Pre-theoretical 'Everyday Self'
We have seen how the Heideggerian approach to interpreting the human phenomenon emphasizes the everyday way humans primarily and for the most part dwell in the world. Equipped with this knowledge, we have now reached a stage where a fi rst direct parallel can be drawn between the 'Western' thought of Heidegger and that of an 'Eastern' thinker referred to on numerous occasion by Nonaka in his later works: Kitaro Nishida, founder of the so-called Kyoto school, who began his philosophical investigation of ancient Japanese tradition around the beginning of the 20th century. Nishida Organization 14(1) Articles treats a dichotomy between the self and the world as a purely 'intellectual act', which, however, is not refl ective of the way of being of an actual self immersed in the actions of everyday life. Quite to the contrary, achieving intellectual separation between the self and the world requires a very high degree of abstraction from this mode of being. To the same extent that one succeeds in pursuing this intellectual separation and abstraction process, Nishida (1990: 90) suggests that the concrete acting 'living' self 'dies off'. From Nishida's point of view, the Cartesian distinction between subject and object to secure objective mathematical knowledge comes at a high price: the more detached a scientifi c subject becomes, the more the human self distances itself from the unity and oneness with nature that is only open to and accessible by the acting, 'living' self.
It is important to note in this context, however, that Nishida does not mean to suggest that the Cartesian project is in itself 'impossible', 'simply false' or 'not be trusted', he rather points out that pursuing the process of abstraction, i.e. focusing entirely on abstract levels of the self, inevitably leads to a lack of awareness regarding other aspects of the human self. This point is important, since it highlights the fact that when considering 'Eastern' and 'Western' approaches to the conception of knowledge, the question of which theory is true and which is false is perhaps not the most adequate way of approaching this subject. A more fertile approach might be to outline the assumptions made by the respective theories and consider the implications of adopting one theory over the other.
The same holds true for Heidegger's theory of knowledge, which does not require a mutually exclusive 'either/or' decision between the phenomenological approach and a scientifi c/analytic way of conceiving knowledge; the analytic method as adopted by individual sciences is not discredited by a phenomenological approach. Heidegger sees absolutely nothing inherently 'wrong', 'bad' or 'false' in scientifi cally organizing explicit knowledge; all these explicit knowledge aspects indeed uncover vital, highly interesting and useful new aspects regarding certain objects. This is never called into question. According to Heidegger, and very similar to Nishida's concerns, problems only arise if the focus is set entirely on this kind of explicit knowledge, because this threatens to destroy all awareness of the pre-theoretical, underlying tacit nexus of meaning that forms the ground from which knowledge continues to arise before it can ever be subjected to scientifi c analysis. Heidegger's phenomenological approach does not discredit explicit knowledge, it provides a sort of 'topology' for different sorts of knowledge.
A Phenomenological Interpretation of the Social, Interpersonal Nature of Human Existence
Thus far, we have referred to the term 'dwelling' on several occasions without explicating it further. The word itself has 'spatial' or 'placecentered' connotations which naturally raises the question of whether or Bridging 'The Great Divide' Stefan Gueldenberg and Holger Helting not there might be any parallels between Heidegger's thought on space and the concept of Ba introduced by Nonaka et al. in works subsequent to The Knowledge Creating Company (Nonaka and Konno, 1998; Nonaka et al., 2000) . Nonaka borrows the term Ba from Nishida, who explicated it in terms of shared space or place. Since this concept denotes shared space, we cannot fully investigate possible parallels between 'Eastern' and 'Western' thoughts on the Ba concept until we have highlighted and understood yet another equally important factor that differentiates the Heideggerian project from the Cartesian project: the notion of 'being-with-others', i.e. the notion of interpersonal relationships as an essential constituent of the human self.
The Cartesian interpretation of the human being as a thinking subject not only views the self as standing opposite to the world of objects, it also isolates the human being as a self-contained agent that by itself does not stand in any sort of primary, let alone necessary, relationship to other human beings. Contrary to this view, Heidegger (in the course of his phenomenological interpretations of everyday world interactions) interprets the human self to be fundamentally constituted by a relationship to other human beings. Thus, existing as a human being always, and by its very nature, implies existing as a human being constituted through an essential relationship not only to the world but also towards other humans. The essential relationship constituting the human self (its 'being-with-others)' is frequently overlooked or misinterpreted, even among Heideggerian scholars (for an in-depth discussion on this point see Helting, 1999: 200) . A quote that intuitively illustrates how seriously Heidegger took the notion of 'being-with-others' is a reference regarding the well known 'I-Thou' formula (e.g. Buber, 1970) . The 'I-Thou' relationship is often viewed as a paradigmatic way of stressing the importance of the relationship between humans. Heidegger, however, suggests that even this formula is still inadequate in describing the mutual, reciprocal relationship that always constitutes humans:
Instead of continuing to talk about a so called I-Thou relationship, it would be more adequate to talk about the 'Thou-Thou' relationship, because 'I-Thou' is always speaking from the viewpoint of myself, whereas we are really talking about a mutual relationship here. (Heidegger, 1987: S. 263) Bridging the Great Divide, Part 2: Chung Tzu's Interpretation of the Social, Interpersonal Aspect of the Human Self Again, there are interesting parallels to be found here in 'Eastern' thought, and a pointed illustration of the essential relationship to other humans and its related pre-theoretical knowledge is offered in the ancient Chinese 'teachings' of Chuang Tzu. The following story is also discussed by the Kyoto School: Chuang Tzu said, 'You're not I, so how do you know I don't know what fi sh enjoy? ' (Chuang Tzu, 1968: 189) With these words, Chuang Tzu points out to his interlocutor that we are always immersed in some kind of preliminary understanding even though such understanding does not entail methodically secured certainty. This preliminary understanding arises from the shared way we interact with each other and with the world. It is this preliminary pre-theoretical understanding that allows us to become attuned to many aspects of being that we do not understand on a more refl ective level. In this sense, Chuang Tzu concludes the conversation by saying that he recognizes what fi sh really enjoy from the (shared) enjoyment of strolling alongside the river.
Bridging the Great Divide, Part 3: Interpretations of Ba as Shared Time-Space in 'Eastern' and 'Western' Theories
Thus far, we have seen that Heidegger interprets the mode of existence of humans as a shared way of 'being-in-the-world', i.e. the human being is not an isolated self standing opposite towards the world of objects or his fellow human beings, but always and from the outset dwells in a pretheoretical understanding of the world that he/she shares with other human beings in a given social, cultural tradition. Even though all dialogue in some way or other draws from the inherited horizon of understanding, the implications of which can never be fully explicitly understood, there always remains a hidden realm from which new views, new ways of understanding can emerge, and thus dynamic interaction between people of different backgrounds and cultures always brings with it the chance of raising awareness of hitherto unknown aspects and bringing them forth from a tacit realm into a shared explicit understanding. In fact, it is precisely this dialogue with foreign cultures that is of tremendous help in shedding explicit light on tacitly understood things, since that which appears 'selfexplanatory' and is so familiar that no conscious note is taken of it any longer within one particular culture must fi rst be explicated to some degree to give someone who is entirely unfamiliar with the background or tradition some chance of being able to relate to it. In this sense, Heidegger stresses the importance of venturing out into that which is foreign in order to really become familiar with and aware of one's own home territory:
Sojourn in foreign realms and the process of alienation within those realms must take place in order for that which is one's own to begin glowing in light of that which is foreign. (Heidegger, 1992: 175) The main reason why Nonaka introduces the Japanese word Ba to describe the place where the knowledge creation process is given time and space to materialize is that, in his interpretation, the Western notion of space fails to capture the important aspect of the lived time-space he intended to Bridging 'The Great Divide' Stefan Gueldenberg and Holger Helting refer to in the context of his theory. Nonaka alludes to Heidegger's notion of time-space as being perhaps of similar nature, but does not elaborate further on this point (Nonaka et al., 2000: 14) .
This does not come as too great a surprise, given the extremely diffi cult nature of Heideggerian texts pertaining to 'time-space'. Throughout his life, Heidegger continually refused to publish his second fundamental book Contributions to Philosophy, since he felt that Being and Time was already all too often misconstrued by professional philosophers and, thus, the far more complex thoughts contained in the Contributions would only raise even further confusion. The work was fi nally published posthumously 13 years after his death (Heidegger, 1989) and contains an entire section devoted to the notion of time-space, probably the most diffi cult section of an already very diffi cult book. It therefore seems highly unlikely that Nonaka, in making this reference to Heidegger's time-space notion, can actually have based it on a primary source text study of this particular section.
Nonetheless, whatever Nonaka's source, the reference in itself is apt, and Heidegger's time-space notion can indeed be explicated as a concept exhibiting intriguing parallels to the concept of Ba as put forth by Nishida. Heidegger interprets 'time-space' as the abyss forming the primordial unity of time and space that, in turn, is interpreted as the essence of truth in terms of the interplay of concealing and revealing (Heidegger, 1989: 379) . The hidden, tacit dimension in Heidegger's conception of truth as outlined in Being and Time is given deeper signifi cance in Heidegger's later work, where 'concealment' is interpreted as an 'abyss'. The tacit dimension no longer merely denotes the primordial nexus of meaning in which human beings dwell yet which they are not able to fully explicate (and, hence, always remains 'tacit' to some degree), but turns into the hidden source providing the actual time and space within which entities and human understanding emerge and encounter each other. The tacit dimension is interpreted as an 'abyss' in the sense that it can never be encountered as an entity itself, as all entities unfold themselves within the time-space provided for them by the 'abysmal' source. It is not merely a purely 'theoretical' or 'speculative' notion either, as it provides the dynamic source for all human understanding and thus, ultimately, also for the theoretical, speculative, abstract or any of the 'higher level' forms of explicit knowledge and notions. Since time-space is the ground for entities to emerge and, thus, not an entity itself, it is 'no thing' or 'no-thing', and can be referred to as 'nothing' in the sense of a non-entity, i.e. in the sense of an unfathomable abyss that cannot be described in any of our usual ways of describing things. It is this 'abysmal' character of time-space in Heidegger's thought that ultimately allows for a comparison of 'Western' and 'Eastern' notions on the deepest possible level by reaching down into the same abyss that represents one of the greatest challenges in the dialogue between 'Eastern' and 'Western' thought: the notion of an 'original nothingness'. If it is possible to step into that abyss, it will fi nally be possible to cross the bridge that joins 'Eastern' and 'Western' knowledge concepts.
Organization 14(1) Articles
Nishida's way of arriving at the concept of Ba can roughly be summarized as follows: in order to establish a relationship between the consciousness and the object, there must also be something that encompasses them both. There has to be some kind of space in which they both refer to each other (cf. Nishida, 1999: 74f) . Ba does not refer to an 'inner sphere of consciousness', but to the process of opening up a concrete space or 'lived place' within which human beings can encounter each other and worldly phenomena. Hence, the 'space' referred to by Ba is neither primarily an 'attribute' of the things nor an attribute of consciousness, nor is it simply a parameter for locating things, it is much rather an 'opening' for encounters. Since it is this primordial Ba-type of 'space' that opens up the place of encounter for everything that is, Nishida refers to this place not as 'something' (= some thing), but as 'nothing' (= no thing): 'The unity of subject and object [...] entails that the place turns into true nothingness' (Nishida, 1999: 85) .
Since the term 'nothingness' is considered quite unproblematic in 'Eastern' philosophy, texts drawn from this tradition can help in advancing a basic understanding of what it refers to. Chapter 11 of the classic Chinese work Tao Te Ching by Lao-Tse offers a number of demonstrative examples to illustrate the meaning of the term 'nothingness' (Lao-Tse, 1992), teaching, for example, that it is precisely because of its 'emptiness' ('nothingness') that a cup is a useful drinking vessel; because it is hollow, the cup provides the space into which liquid can be poured and from which it can be drunk. Similarly, a house without emptiness, i.e. without windows, doors and rooms, would also be of no use. Thus, the term 'nothingness' suggests a 'positive' space-creating aspect and must be clearly differentiated from the common Western concept of 'absolute nothingness' (nihilum absolutum) that refers to nothing whatsoever and carries none of the 'positive' connotations the term carries in Eastern philosophy. In this sense, the Lao-Tse chapter ends with two lines that roughly state: 'If you realize the benefi ts of that which exists, realize also, it is nothingness that renders it useful' (Lao-Tse, 1992: Chapter 11). In this sense, Ba is seen by Nishida as this intangible, yet space-creating event that is itself not the property of an individual or thing, but provides them fi rst and foremost with an action space.
To begin grasping the meaning of Ba (and the 'abysmal' character of Heidegger's time-space for that matter), we must fi rst make an active effort to understand what is not meant by this term, i.e. consciously refrain from attaching the 'standard Western connotations' associated with words like 'nothing' or 'nothingness'. Such connotations are guaranteed to prevent any sort of adequate understanding of Ba and, instead, relegate the term into that corner of 'obscure mysticism' that has no relevance or signifi cance to real life, let alone real business life, and thus does not merit being pondered upon. To explicate what has been stated above: the fact that Ba is not an attribute of consciousness makes it very clear from the outset that Nishida Bridging 'The Great Divide' Stefan Gueldenberg and Holger Helting does not think of Ba along the lines of a 'tabula rasa' theory of mind as formulated in Western philosophy by John Locke, who defi ned the mind as a mere 'blank space' or 'clean sheet' that receives its 'content' via sensory input from objects in the outside world that imprint themselves on the mind in the course of perception (Locke, 1824) . Since Ba encompasses both mind and matter, it could never be adequately thought of as some sort of static, meaningless, 'inner blank space' contingent on sensory input from a world that resides 'outside' and opposite it.
On the other hand, since Nishida explicitly states that Ba is neither any sort of attribute or property of objects in the world nor a Newtonian type of 'container' for the world as a whole (conceived of as a mere agglomeration of entities), Ba consequently could never be encountered as some obscure isolated instance of a 'thing' called 'absolute nothingness' drilling some sort of mystical hole(s) into the world. Rather, Ba refers to the dynamic, generative source of possibilities providing the 'room' or 'space' for innovations to emerge.
Thinking of Ba not in terms of an obscure entity or 'static blank mind', but rather in terms of a process or 'generative potential' or 'omnipresent realm of pure possibilities allowing for new useful things, concepts and ideas to emerge anytime in any given concrete cultural context we happen to dwell in' should make the 'alien' sounding notion of Ba a bit more intelligible. This notion, as evidenced by Heidegger's treatise on time-space, is not something entirely 'unintelligible' to 'Westerners' but, to be properly understood, certainly requires them to step out of their traditional thought patterns. Perhaps the most intuitive and practical approach towards understanding Ba is simply to draw on one's own personal 'everyday experience', i.e. raising to the level of awareness the fact that in any given 'real world' situation there is always some sort of 'room' or 'potential' for the emergence of innovation and new encounters. Ba quite simply refers to the most fundamental aspect of the process of 'making room' for all this to happen and thus providing the unfathomable ground from which new views, hunches and innovative ideas suddenly emerge and are explicated.
A Critical Review of Nonaka's Epistemological Assumptions in the Context of their Philosophical Backgrounds
The main problem with virtually all of Nonaka's claims regarding intellectual histories resides in the fact that they tend to be made in such an overgeneralizing manner that they lack the necessary rigour to be considered as academically sound proposals and thus run the risk of becoming targets for (all too) easy criticism. It is this lack of rigour that we will illustrate and criticize in the following three subsections by scrutinizing some of the general claims made by Nonaka with reference to notions pertaining to 'Western' and 'Eastern' intellectual history in the context of introducing and developing his knowledge theory.
Organization 14(1) Articles

Knowledge and Certainty -Not always the Core Issues in 'Western' Philosophy
As far as the Cartesian project in its original pure form is concerned, it would be fair to argue that the quest for certainty was indeed the goal. However, this does not imply that all 'Western' philosophy both before and after Descartes had been and continued to be only interested in 'truth beyond all doubt'. Nonaka et al. tend to portray the Cartesian quest for the 'ultimate truth beyond all doubt' as being the mainstream epistemological concern in the entire history of Western philosophy since Plato and Aristotle (cf. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 21) Doubtless, there were some schools propagating skepticism even in antiquity which based their skepticism on the lack of certainty in matters of knowledge; but, to put it bluntly, it is simply wrong to view the quest for certainty and precision (and associated skepticism) as the main, predominant characteristic trademark of all Western philosophy, be it ancient or modern.
A paradigmatic example of a philosopher in antiquity who maintained that it is not possible or even meaningful to require the same level of 'precision' or 'certainty' in all areas of research is Aristotle. Rather than discarding all disciplines that are incapable of providing results with 'mathematical' or 'logical' precision or declaring them irrelevant and devoid of any signifi cance, Aristotle instead discards the human attitude that expects such precision irrespective of discipline. He sees the ability to distinguish the level of 'precision' appropriate for any given intellectual endeavor as the very mark of an educated man. Conversely, Aristotle considers it a sign of 'foolishness' when someone asks for certainty or precision in a fi eld where such precision is simply inappropriate to the subject matter:
…for it is the mark of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject admits; it is evidently equally foolish to accept probable reasoning from a mathematician and to demand from a rhetorician scientifi c proofs. (Aristotle, 1908 (Aristotle, : 1094b Book I, Chapter 3) It is interesting to observe how Nonaka and colleagues simply ignore this basic Aristotelian tenor in their deliberations, preferring instead to also link Aristotle to an emphasis on 'clear verifi cation' (cf. Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995: 23) . In doing so, they falsely reduce the truly vast range of topics studied by Aristotle to his comparatively few books on the philosophy of logic. (Just a few of the many subjects to which Aristotle devoted entire books still extant today include: ethics, politics, rhetoric, dreams, metaphysics, sleep and sleeplessness, life and death, the Athenian constitution, the soul, breathing, meteorology, …) According to Aristotle, it is not the human being that decides the manner in which knowledge ought to be obtained, but rather the nature of things which determines what kind of knowledge and precision can be obtained in a given area of research.Thus, it is defi nitely not the case that all 'Western' ways of acquiring knowledge Stefan Gueldenberg and Holger Helting are and have always been ultimately targeted at gathering 'knowledge beyond all doubt': there are plenty of important research fi elds to which Aristotle devoted a great deal of attention where 'certainty' or 'mathematical precision' could never be obtained and where-in his view-no educated man should ever expect to do so.
Knowledge as Justifi ed True Belief -Contrary to Popular Belief, a Formula Originally Discarded
On several occasions, Nonaka and colleagues refer to the Platonic dialogue Theaetetus, in which the classic 'Western' defi nition of knowledge as 'justifi ed true belief' is allegedly formulated, as an authoritative defi nition of knowledge that has shaped all 'Western' epistemology ever since. Their arguments pertaining to this formula are aimed at illustrating how Western philosophy from Plato onwards has continued to propagate an 'absolute, static and non-human view of knowledge' (Nonaka et al., 2000: 7) , i.e. al-ways stressing the true belief part of this formula and consequently losing sight of the human justifi cation process itself. To regain that which the West had (allegedly) lost from the beginning, Nonaka and Colleagues claim to offer a 'new' and dynamic approach to the knowledge concept that emphasizes the dynamic justifi cation process in the course of human interaction.This 'innovative' shift away from the static 'true' aspect of the 'justifi ed true belief' formula to the dynamic 'justifi cation' ('justifi ed true belief'), is designed to yield a more adequate and humane knowledge concept that for the fi rst time is also capable of accounting for the actual process of knowledge creation.
The fi rst point that must be noted in this context is that this allegedly authoritative Platonic defi nition of knowledge is by no means ramifi ed by Plato in his Theaetetus dialogue; in fact, it is much rather rejected as an inappropriate and untenable defi nition of knowledge when Plato, at the end of the dialogue, clearly and unequivocally states: So, Theaetetus, neither perception, nor true belief, nor the addition of an 'account' to true belief can be knowledge. (Plato, 1987: 365; 210a-b) Just as we witnessed Nonaka in the previous section trying to force Aristotle into the corset of logic (and thus Cartesian-type level of certainty) by simply ignoring everything else the philosopher said and wrote, we now fi nd ourselves witnessing him trying to force the 'Platonic' formula into a similar Cartesian framework-again without paying any attention to what Plato had actually had to say and the way he said it.
If we study the original source, it immediately becomes apparent that the defi nition of knowledge as 'justifi ed true belief' as put forth in the Theaetetus dialogue cannot be viewed as the anchor point in Western philosophy which propagates an 'absolute, static and non-human view of knowledge'. For Plato, approaching truth through dialogue and the justifi cation process seems to be far more important than defi ning some sort of 'static and everlasting' defi nition of knowledge or truth 'once and for all'; the dialogue Organization 14(1) Articles in Theaetetus concludes by alluding to a need to continue the discussions 'the next day'. In other words, because a defi nition of knowledge has not been found, it is further dialogue that is suggested as a way of approaching truth and knowledge. Dialogue is helpful in this process, because it frees the people engaged in it from any form of preconceived, static 'knowledge' they only seem to possess, and opens their minds to new dimensions that would not be encountered were everybody to believe that they somehow already knew all aspects of some 'ultimate static truth'. Plato's mentor, Socrates, emphasized this point even in the face of death during his trial while outlining the reasons for his lifelong devotion to the search for truth and knowledge (Apology; Plato, 1987) .
When the dialogue approach to contemplating issues such as 'knowledge' and 'truth' is taken seriously, the Platonic conception of these notions becomes very much 'alive' and 'dynamic' and presents something entirely different to the 'absolute, static and non-human view of knowledge' portrayed by Nonaka. In the dynamic process of a dialogue, it is precisely these 'static views' that are discarded and the human mind kept open to that which is hitherto 'unknown'. Hence, in a sense, the 'tacit' or hidden dimension of knowledge is very much present and alive in the course of a dialogue; although this is admittedly not explicitly addressed by Plato to the same extent as by Polanyi or Heidegger, it is most certainly 'hinted at' paradigmatically in Plato's Republic, where the 'idea of the good' is named as the 'source of knowledge and truth' transcending being (Greek: epeikeina tes ousias) (Plato 1987: 591a-b) . Plato instead shows this process 'in action' by having his interlocutors discard one 'static' conception after the other. Knowledge is hence explicated in the course of a Platonic dialogue, and the result of this process of explication, i.e. theoretical knowledge, has a place in Plato's thinking, but he also considers it at least equally important to continue pointing out the limits and shortcomings of any such explicit defi nitions, as they, in turn, call for further human dialogue in which static notions can be discarded and from which new insights can emerge. Nonaka simply fails to appreciate the richness of what he loosely labels Western philosophy; drawing insights from this tacit dimension was by no means totally 'absent' in Plato's thought, it was very much alive in his dialogues, i.e. in the dynamic human interaction process where justifi cations are attempted over and over again and partial theoretical results are obtained yet ultimately discarded again to prevent stagnation in the dynamic fl ow of knowledge generation.
The Notion of Ba and Descartes' Infl uence on its Introduction in the Context of 20th Century Knowledge Management Research
In their more recent publications, Nonaka et al. increasingly address the issue of how to design the correct 'enabling conditions' for the knowledge creation process, basing this work on the assumption that knowledge cannot be created out of context: Stefan Gueldenberg and Holger Helting Contrary to the Cartesian view of knowledge, which emphasizes the absolute and context-free nature of knowledge, the knowledge-creating process is necessarily context-specifi c in terms of who participates and how they participate. Knowledge needs a physical context to be created. (Nonaka et al., 2000: 13) At the risk of repeating ourselves, once again we here witness Nonaka and colleagues reducing Western philosophy to the Cartesian paradigm: this time in the context of space. Since antiquity, and long before Descartes developed his notion of pure 'analytical space', other Western philosophers had stressed very diverging conceptions of space. Plato offers an interesting account of the chora, i.e. space, in his Timaeus dialogue (Plato, 1987 (Plato, : 1178 52a-c) by outlining how his theory of forms requires space for phenomena to emerge. Aristotle devotes considerable time to the notion of topos, i.e. place, region, space, in his works on physics (Aristotle, 1980: 276; Book IV) arguing against the notion of space as a context-free mere 'void'.
Nonaka, as we have seen, makes a very general reference to Heidegger, acknowledging that his notion might be very closely related to Nonaka's own, borrowed concept of Ba. As we have also seen, even though this reference is indeed appropriate, the mere reference will not help the reader better understand the concept of Ba unless he/she happens to be a scholar of later Heideggerian thought and thus happens to be familiar with his notoriously diffi cult passages on time-space (cf. Heidegger, 1989: 371-88) or with the (admittedly scarcely easier to read) passages of a presentation Heidegger gave in 1951 elaborating how 'dwelling' in primordial, i.e. contextual, space allows for meaningful ways of 'building' and 'thinking' on the ground this space provides (Heidegger, 1990: 139-56) .
Neither the reduction of Western knowledge conceptions to the Cartesian project nor the general references to Heidegger devoid of any further explanation appear particularly well suited to advancing a better understanding of the concept of Ba among 'Western' readers. On the contrary, Nonaka's failure to acknowledge the richness of 'Western' intellectual traditions simply opens the door for justifi ed criticism, while his failure to elaborate on where exactly the parallels to the notion of Ba lie in Heidegger's work inevitably renders such references useless for all practical purposes, since those who are familiar with Heidegger will not fail to see the parallels even without this reference and those who are not familiar with Heidegger's thought will need (a lot) more than a simple reference to appreciate the parallels alluded to in this context.
Implications of the Critical Analysis for the Field of Knowledge Management
Given the critical examination of Nonaka's work above, it might at this point be diffi cult to see how the thesis stated at the beginning of this article, whereby Nonaka's theory is described (among other things) as a 'powerful framework', could possibly be upheld. The true strength and power of Organization 14(1) Articles Nonaka's theory resides in the fact that it is aimed at a comprehensive and deep concept of knowledge. Nonaka's knowledge creation theory is comprehensive in the sense that it tries to take into account all factors and levels pertinent to the process of knowledge generation, i.e. it is not only concerned with a few 'high level', abstract, explicit propositions, but also realizes that this is the fi nal stage in a long process of abstraction whose origins can be traced back to a pre-theoretical, pre-propositional shared nexus of meaning in which human beings inevitably always dwell. As Polanyi's notion of the tacit dimension aptly indicates, it is more appropriate to think of this pre-propositional nexus of meaning in terms of a fi eld in which we dwell and which provides the fertile ground for phenomena to emerge that we always encounter in some sort of horizon of meaning never explicitly known in all respects. This fi eld opens up a shared, living dimension and is not some obscure conglomerate comprised of atomic, isolated parts that we could somehow unearth in its entirety. If we tried to coin a phrase along the lines of Polanyi's 'We can know more than we can tell' to describe the relationship between the tacit dimension and explicit knowledge, it might read along the lines of 'We understand more than we think' or, less 'catchy' but more comprehensive, 'We (implicitly) understand/know more than we (consciously) think and will ever (for that matter have the need to) explicitly know'.
Within such a fi eld, it is certainly possible to focus on certain phenomena, and abstract them from their natural fi eld occurrence, i.e. explicate them and treat them in isolation. There is nothing inherently 'wrong', 'bad' or 'false' in doing so, it is only important to be aware that this explication process always occurs within the fi eld lest the source of all knowledge be ignored. The notion of 'dwelling' implies that we are immersed in this fi eld and not impartial bystanders outside or opposite to it and thus never capable of explicating the fi eld as a whole; focusing on one part or aspect of a particular phenomenon occurring in this fi eld inevitably abstracts it from its original fi eld context. On the other hand, dealing explicitly with certain phenomena might raise interesting questions that would lead us to take a closer look at other aspects hitherto implicitly taken for granted and whose importance had not yet been realized. Viewed as a dynamic process, interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge becomes possible as the process character abolishes the notion that these two 'kinds' of knowledge are diametrically opposed.
The notion of a process in which propositional knowledge is abstracted from a tacitly understood, lived, shared pre-propositional fi eld of meaning indicates how explicit and tacit knowing is not separate, but rather interrelates. Tacit knowing refers to the context, fi eld or source from which more explicit forms of knowing evolve. All explicit knowledge transfer occurs within this fi eld. Once the tacit dimension has been understood in terms of a fi eld, it immediately becomes apparent why it is futile to seek a way of explicating all knowledge, why it is impossible to reduce one form of Stefan Gueldenberg and Holger Helting knowledge to the other. Because Nonaka's theory tries to take into account the roots of knowledge, it is thus not only comprehensive, but also deep.
Having outlined the strengths of this theory, we must now summarize its weaknesses and their implications for knowledge management theory. Even though Nonaka's framework has the potential to evolve into a comprehensive, deep and intellectually grounded theory, the justifi cations from intellectual history provided to date by Nonaka himself remain at best shallow and, as indicated above, are often simply false and misleading. Introducing philosophical notions into the knowledge management discourse was a bold move by Nonaka deserving true merit, but his own theory is not helped by setting high standards regarding theoretical groundings, yet not living up to these very standards himself, thereby opening the door to criticism that potentially overshadows all the true power inherent in this approach to knowledge conceptualization. Furthermore, given that a number of Japanese thinkers of the Kyoto school have themselves published far more diligent and refi ned works exploring the possible parallels between 'Eastern' and 'Western' thought (e.g. Ueda, 1981 , and his work on 'Western' medieval philosophical thought), doubts arise as to what degree Nonaka is even aware of the high quality of work being done with regard to the 'Western' tradition within his own 'Eastern' tradition. A philosopher like Ueda would certainly not try at all cost to force all 'Western' medieval thought into a Cartesian paradigm.
It is true that Nonaka makes a few references to the non-mainstream 'Western' conception of knowledge (e.g. as propagated by Heidegger) and it is equally true that such a conception has the potential of rooting his overall framework in a sound philosophical theory, but Nonaka himself does not really seem to be capable of clarifying the implications of these references to any degree, let alone make these allusions intelligible to nonHeideggerian scholars. Should he indeed be capable of doing so, he certainly does not seem to show any interest in enlightening his readers further. Simply pointing to a historical interpretation ramifying the 'great divide' and introducing untranslated terms such as Ba with the justifi cation that there virtually seems to be no Western notion that comes even close to capturing their meaning(s) must inevitably leave the reader with the feeling that, whilst these concepts might make sense and have their applicability in the 'East', they do not seem to have any counterpart or connection points in the 'Western' world. Yet, as demonstrated above, such concerns reveal themselves as unnecessary, since it is possible to fi nd ways of bridging 'Western' and 'Eastern' concepts, even notoriously diffi cult notions such as that of Ba as 'original nothingness'.
To be fair, Nonaka does provide some examples that offer an intuitive approach to his knowledge creation theory and there is, of course, nothing wrong with providing such examples. In fact, if he were to confi ne himself to providing such examples and refrain from wanting to base his theory on sound epistemology, many of the problems outlined in this article would automatically disappear. No professor of knowledge management can be Organization 14(1) Articles expected to devise a theory of knowledge creation based on a full-blown, profound and philosophically sound theory of knowledge; indeed, even thinking about such an endeavour would require deep interdisciplinary collaboration. The problems arise far more when Nonaka himself starts claiming to have a sound 'epistemological grounding' for his theory when that is nowhere near the case.
Conclusions
As a result of our analysis, and in line with the original thesis of the article, we conclude that the framework developed by Nonaka and colleagues has the potential for offering a comprehensive and deep understanding of knowledge and knowledge management. The reason we have phrased some of our critical remarks in rather harsh terms is that we feel the obvious weaknesses in Nonaka's theory that are related to his own attempts at 'rooting' his theory in 'epistemology' are, in fact, unnecessary in the sense that they could be mended through diligent and committed interdisciplinary work. Grounding the theory on solid philosophical roots is, of course, only one important aspect to consider when looking at Nonaka's theory; outlining and continuing to develop its practical implications is a task that is at least equally as important as the theoretical grounding, but falls outside of the scope of this article and its exclusive focus on matters pertaining to an intellectually sound and viable conception of knowledge.
